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Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore, rest in peace There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side .Here in this country of ours You, the mothers who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears .Your sons are now lying in our bosom And are in peace After having lost their lives on this land, they have become our sons as well .
M. KEMAL ATATURK, 1934
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The Battles
Gallipoli
Whilst researching an Anzac you will come across some names of places where your soldier fought and maybe even died. Over 33000 allied and 86000 Turkish troops died in the eight-month Gallipoli campaign which achieved none of its objectives. A British royal commission later concluded that the operation had been ill-conceived. Gallipoli cost 8700 Australian dead and 19000 wounded. Large numbers of the dead have no known grave. The story of Anzac has had an enduring effect on the way Australians see themselves. Though the campaign was a failure, Anzac has come to stand, in the words of the official historian, C.E.W. Bean, "for reckless valour in a good cause, for enterprise, recourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship and endurance".1
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The Landing
25th April 1915
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For Australians and New Zealanders, the landing at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 is forever associated with a short stretch of beach known as Anzac Cove. The cove was part of the small portion of the Gallipoli peninsula captured that day by the men of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps–the ‘Anzacs’–and held until the evacuation in December 1915. Australia’s official war historian, Charles Bean, would later describe this small area as ‘Old Anzac’
Prior to the start of the Gallipoli campaign Anzac Cove did not exist. On 25 April 1915, as part of the overall Allied plan, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (or Anzacs) were ordered to land on the Peninsula's Aegean coastline to seize the hill of Mal Tepe 5 miles inland and threaten the northern flank of the Kilid Bahr Plateau. The exact position of the landing remained vague with the military orders placing it between Gaba Tepe and Fisherman's Hut, a distance of roughly two and a half miles. The naval orders were somewhat more precise, pinning the southern flank of the landing one mile north of Gaba Tepe. Once the covering force of the 3rd Australian Brigade had landed and secured its position, the remainder of the 1st Australian Division followed by the New Zealand and Australian Division were then to push through towards Mal Tepe.
In the event the landing was very confused and set in train a sequence of events that were never to be overcome. Not only did the boats of the first wave contract into a much reduced line significantly to the north of the expected beach, they also became intermingled before the troops could disembark. As a result the men went ashore in considerable disarray. The second wave then followed in order, ironically compounding the original errors. Throughout the day the main body of the 1st Australian Division continued to land and move into this uncertain position. But, as Turkish pressure mounted, any residual coherence within the Anzac line was lost. Overnight, with the positions fragmented and many wounded on the beach, the question of re-embarkation was raised. But, after being rejected, the Anzacs were ordered to dig in which they did with consummate success.
In the confusion of the initial landing, most of the first boats grounded along a narrow stretch of the shore between the small headlands of Ari Burnu and what became known as Hell Spit. Offering a slight degree of protection from Turkish observation and gunfire, this tiny inlet became the heart of the Australian and New Zealand line and was given the legendary name of Anzac Cove. Around it a claustrophobic, overlooked position grew up. The Anzacs were unable to break out, as their last concerted assault on 1-2 May clearly showed. But likewise the successive attempts made by the Turks to drive them into the sea, which culminated in the heavy attack of 19 May, were also all heavily defeated. From the start of June until the evacuation on 19 December, all actions were either diversionary or local, aimed simply at improving positions in the line. Even the giant move to the north begun on 6 August against Chunuk Bair and the height of the Sari Bair ridge in the end resulted in little improvement to the original Anzac position.
Life at Anzac was unique. The terrain was bewildering, formed both by natural gullies and deep, man-made tunnels and trenches. The Turks were at places almost within arm's reach, and access was possible only from the sea via a handful of vulnerable piers which were all subject to shellfire. The experience was fuelled by a heady mixture of futility, pride, self-reliance and degradation. Unpleasant, unsought, it bestowed on all those who survived it a badge of stamina and courage and helped to define the distinctive national characteristics of the new nations of Australia and New Zealand.
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Lone Pine
6 August 1915
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One of the most famous assaults of the Gallipoli campaign, the Battle of Lone Pine was originally intended as a diversion from attempts by New Zealand and Australian units to force a breakout from the ANZAC perimeter on the heights of Chunuk Bair and Hill 971. The Lone Pine attack, launched by the 1st Brigade AIF in the late afternoon of 6 August 1915 pitched Australian forces against formidable entrenched Turkish positions, sections of which were securely roofed over with pine logs. In some instances the attackers had to break in through the roof of the trench systems in order to engage the defenders. The main Turkish trench was taken within 20 minutes of the initial charge but this was the prelude to 4 days of intense hand-to-hand fighting, resulting in over 2,000 Australians being killed.The Turks lost almost 7000 men of the 16th Division. No fewer than seven Victoria Crosses were awarded to Australian troops.
Source - AWM
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The Nek
6 August 1915
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On the 7th of August 1915 four waves of men from the 8th & 10th light horse attacked the Nek. The Nek was one of three attacks used as a diversion to enable a British landing at Suvla bay. The other objective of the attack was to capture higher ground at Baby 700 which Turkish soldiers held.
But what occurred was a disaster.
This attack was one of the most infamous ever made by the ANZAC's at Gallipoli. It was because of a lack of communication that the Allied artillery bombardment ended early. This allowed the Turks to reoccupy their trenches and they were well prepared and ready for the attack. As a result of this the ANZAC's were mown down as they left their trenches.
The amazing thing is that 4 waves of soldiers attacked over a period of 45 minutes. Each wave saw clearly the carnage that went before them, however no man shirked his duty and bravely charged when the order was given.
Points of Interest
 The 8th light Horse were comprised of men from Victoria and the
men from the 10th Light Horse were originally from Western Australia.
 The 8th & 10th Light Horse fought the Gallipoli campaign dismounted.
 Each wave had the strength of 150 men.
 The width of the area in which the campaign was fought was no larger than two tennis courts.
 Lt Col J.W. Springthorpe said to the 3rd wave of the Light Horse,
"Boys you have ten minutes to live and I'm going to lead you."
 This battle is the one featured in the movie Gallipoli
To this day there are only ten marked graves at the Nek cemetery. This is because the men who died at the Nek were not buried until after the war in 1919. Therefore a positive identification could not be carried out for the majority of men that were killed at the Nek.
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 Sari Bair
6 August 1915
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Sari Bair Ridge is made up of the north easterly range of hills that climbs gradually up via a series of peaks from the northern end of the Anzac beachhead. Starting with Baby 700 they roll through Battleship Hill to Chunuk Bair at 850 feet. From there they rise to the twin peaks of Hill Q (900 feet) and finally to Koja Chemen Tepe or Hill 971 at the highest point. From this ridge line descend a maze of gullies (Deres) cut by winter rainfall sluicing down from the peaks. These merge into three main valleys: Sazli Beit Dere, Chailak Dere and Aghyl Dere.
The northern breakout from Anzac was the centre piece of the whole August offensive. It would begin with the capture of all identified Turkish outposts covering these gullies. The assaulting columns would then drive up the gullies to capture the key heights of Hill 971, Hill Q and Chunuk Bair before moving south down the ridge to clear Battleship Hill and Baby 700 in conjunction with another attack from Russell's Top across the Nek. All other elements of the August offensive were intended to be subordinate to the successful conclusion of this plan.
The assault began late on the evening of 6 August and although the first attacks on the Turkish covering positions were successful it soon became clear that the operation was too ambitious.
The assaulting columns began to lose their way as they struggled through the maze of inter-cutting ravines harassed by the light, but elusive, opposition of the Turks. This slowed progress to a crawl. It became a dreadful test of endurance for the troops - some of whom had already been greatly weakened by their experiences over the last three months at Anzac. When dawn broke on 7 August the columns, which should have been on the summits along Sari Bair Ridge, were still languishing far below in the gullies and lower ridges leading up to the peaks. A further series of attacks was ordered which resulted in lodgments on Chunuk Bair and Hill Q on 8 August. But the end of 9 August the question was no longer whether the British could seize control of Sari Bair but whether they could hold on to the gains they had made.
The men were in badly entrenched enfiladed positions; they were exhausted, hungry, thirsty and lacking in local leadership as a result of the high casualties amongst their officers and NCOs. Above all the divisions and brigades had become totally inter-mixed with no clearly defined command structure and they were bereft of orders to tell them what they were meant to be trying to do. It was a potentially disastrous situation.
On 10 August, Mustafa Kemal led the newly-arrived Turkish reserves in a massed counter-attack across the top of Sari Bair Ridge. Pushed back from Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, the British came tumbling back from the hills, sometimes in good order, sometimes not. The attempt to seize the Sari Bair heights had ended, as it had begun, in failure.
The British forces had fought hard and significantly increased the original Anzac position, but although the ground captured was to prove valuable it was poor compensation for the glittering prizes that had eluded them. Over the next few days the dying echoes of the battle reverberated around the hills as positions were established and local confrontations resolved. On a military level they were irrelevant. The strategic questions, as opposed to the tactical niceties, had been answered. The Anzac offensive had effectively failed by dawn on 7 August when the assaulting columns were not entrenched up on the heights. After that failure, success was never particularly likely as more and more Turks arrived to oppose further assaults which were essentially reworkings of the original, failed plan.
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 Chunuk Bair
8th August 1915
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The next desperate attempt to capture the summit of Chanuk Bair was made by the New Zealanders at dawn, 8 August. Just after 3am - as the naval bombardment ceased - Lt Colonel Malone led the first wave of Wellingtons calmly up the slope, with Glouchesters following on his left, and then incredibly, disappearing from sight over the crest. The first Turks Malone encountered were machine-gunners fast asleep! After a brief struggle with the enemy Malone's men occupied their trenches and looked down through the half-light on the grey waters of the Dardanelles.They had taken the crest.
For 12 hours Malone and his Wellingtons held the crest alone. At 4pm the first of the Aucklands sprinted up the slope to join him and soon afterwards Malone was killed by a shell burst. As night fell reinforcements could at last make their way up to the crest. bringing food and water with them, and the Otagos, and the Wellington Mounted Rifles took over the trenches.
Of the 760 men of the Wellington Battalion who took held the crest of Chunuk Bair only 70 survived to stumble down the slope in the dark. To men who saw the
Zealanders they looked like the living dead, like, their uniforms in shreds,incapable of speech. The first New Zealand Victoria Cross of the Great War was won that day, awarded to Corporal C. Basset who had laid a from the HQ at the base of the slope amid bullets and artillery bursts as calmly as his fellow New Zealanders had held their ragged,corpse-strewn line on the crest of Chanuk Bair.
On 8 August Liman had entrusted Mustafa Kemal, the one Turkish commander in whom he had complete confidence, with the defence of the front stretching from Suvla to Anzac. This dynamic man only months before a Lieutenant Colonel, now a “Pasha” and within years to be known to history as Kemal Ataturk threw a desperate attack forward at Damakjelik Bair that was repulsed be Australian and British troops,
Just before dawn on 10 August Kemal formed his remaining reserves into a human wave that poured over the crest of Chunuk Bair overwhelming in minutes the two unprepared English battalions holding the trenches near the crest and swept on down the slopes to The Farm itself. , where General Baldwin was one of the 1000 killed. The New Zealand machine-gunners at The Apex mowed down hundreds of
Turks and thus retained their hold on Rhododendron Spur: but any chance of taking Chunuk now was lost.
Source Australians at War - A.K.Macdougal
Highly Recommended reading. top
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 Hill 60
21 August 1915
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Lieutenant Wilfred Addison, aged 26, a bank accountant from Sydney, New South Wales, landed on Gallipoli on 19 August 1915 with the 18th Battalion. The unit camped at North Beach between the foot of the Sphinx and Walker's Ridge. According to Charles Bean, the very presence of these fresh young soldiers lifted the spirits of the old hands:
These troops came to the tired, and somewhat haggard garrison of Anzac, like a fresh breeze from the Australian bush. `Great big cheery fellows, whom it did your heart good to see', wrote an Australian. `Quite the biggest lot I have ever seen'.
E W Bean, The Story of Anzac,
Sydney, 1924, Vol II, p.739]
The new arrivals were briefed on the challenges that lay ahead of them on the peninsula. Lieutenant Addison wrote to his mother:
I daresay I shall be one of the first to fall.
[Addison, quoted in C E W Bean, The Story of Anzac,
Sydney, 1924, Vol II, p.739]
As the men of the 18th Battalion pondered their fate, the last British offensive on Gallipoli began on 21 August 1915 at Suvla and in the northern sector of the Anzac position. Two British divisions and a composite force of Anzacs and British troops attacked inland towards the Turkish village of Anafarta. The objective of the composite force was a low promontory at the northern end of a spur coming down from the Kocacimentepe Range. To the Turks it was Kaiajik Aghyl-the Sheepfold of the Little Rock. To the British and the Anzacs, this feature was known prosaically as Hill 60-and its capture would both straighten the line between the Anzac and Suvla positions and make communications along the shore between the two sectors safer.
On 21 August, for the Australians of the 4th Brigade-men of the 13th and 14th Battalions-the initial assault on Hill 60 was a costly failure. They attacked across a shallow valley where dozens of them were hit by Turkish machine guns. Those who reached the comparative safety of the slope on the far side looked back to see their wounded comrades and soldiers of the Hampshire Regiment caught in a bushfire started by Turkish shells. As uniforms caught fire, grenades and ammunition carried by individual soldiers exploded. However, the smoke allowed Captain H G Loughran, the Regimental Medical Officer of the 14th Battalion, assisted by his stretcher-bearers, and Battalion Chaplain Andrew Gillison, a Presbyterian minister from East St Kilda, Melbourne, to drag away some of the wounded.
On the following morning there occurred in this remote and now forgotten sector of the Anzac line one of those acts of bravery and compassion which lie buried in the footnotes of Charles Bean's official history of the Australians at Gallipoli. As Chaplain Gillison read the burial service over some of the recent dead, he heard a groan from a nearby ridge in no-man's-land. Although he had been warned against showing himself in this area, he went forward and discovered a wounded English soldier of the Hampshire Regiment who had lain out all night and was now being attacked by ants. Together with two other men of the 13th Battalion-Corporal Ronald Pittendrigh and Private Hinton-Gillison crawled out to rescue the stricken man. After they had dragged him for about a yard, a Turkish sniper severely wounded Gillison and Pittendrigh. Both men subsequently died-Gillison on the same day, 22 August, and Pittendrigh on 29 August. Chaplain Gillison lies buried in Embarkation Pier Cemetery. Pittendrigh died of his wounds on a hospital ship and his grave is the sea off the shores of Gallipoli. His name is remembered on the Lone Pine Memorial to the missing.
Those in charge at Hill 60 now decided that the only chance of taking the hill lay in using fresh, fit troops. In the early hours of 22 August, the 18th Battalion made its way from North Beach to the Anzac lines opposite the Sheepfold of the Little Rock. By candlelight, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel A E Chapman and his company commanders were, for the first time, briefed that they were about to be sent into action. They were to charge the Turks with bomb and bayonet. When Chapman complained that they had no bombs, he was told to do the best he could without them. The lead companies were then taken to a position near Hill 60 behind a low scrub hedge and told to attack. Now, finally, as the men were given the order to fix bayonets, they learned, just two days after they had landed on Gallipoli, that they were faced with the test of battle.
The first wave of the 18th dashed forward through a gap in the scrub hedge and safely reached a recently dug Turkish trench. By the time the second wave came on from behind the hedge, the Turks were ready and poured down machine gun fire. At the head of his platoon was Lieutenant Wilfred Addison. Charles Bean described what happened:
Other platoons issuing through openings south of it were met by a tremendous fire, but a proportion crossed the field, finely led by some of their officers; among them was Lieutenant Wilfred Addison, who, with dying and wounded men around him, and machine gun bullets tearing up the ground where he stood, steadied and waved forward the remnant of his platoon until he himself fell pierced by several bullets.
[C E W Bean, The Story of Anzac,
Sydney, 1924, Vol II, p.743]
By 10.00 am that day the 18th Battalion's attempt to take Hill 60 had also failed. It had left North Beach 760 strong. In four hours on 21 August the battalion took 383 casualties, of whom approximately 190 were killed. In subsequent actions on Hill 60 the unit suffered another 256 casualties. Within a week of arriving at Gallipoli, over 80 per cent of those who had been described as `great, big cheery fellows' lay either dead or wounded.
Despite the failures of 21 and 22 August, it was decided to press on with the attempt to take Hill 60. As long as the low summit remained in Turkish hands, the movement of men and supplies between the Anzac area in the south and the Suvla sector in the north was unsafe. This next assault was, once again, to be made by a mixed force of Australian, British and New Zealand units. By 27 August, the date set for the attack, the Turks had constructed a complex system of trenches on Hill 60. For these, the British Empire and Dominion forces had no maps or plans and, consequently, little idea of where they were once a section of enemy trench was seized. Once again, elements of the Australian 4th Brigade-250 men from the 13th, 14th and 15th Battalions-were involved in the attack at 5.00 am on 27 August. Within minutes of their advance, two-thirds of them were dead or wounded, and the attack in this sector was abandoned.
For the 4th Brigade, the Gallipoli campaign, which had begun with such high hopes on 25 April, was over. At the landing, the Brigade numbered 4016. Between 6 and 28 August, it had fought exclusively in the battles to the north of the old Anzac lines beneath Chunuk Bair and now at Hill 60. By 28 August, its paper strength had been reduced to 968 weary soldiers. The medical officer of one of its battalions-the 15th, reduced to 170 men from 959 on 25 April-wrote:
The condition of the men of the battalion was awful. Thin, haggard, as weak as kittens and covered with suppurating sores. The total strength of the battalion was two officers and 170 men. If we had been in France every man would have been sent to hospital.
[Regimental Medical Officer, 15th Battalion, quoted in A G Butler,
Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914-1918,
Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea, Vol 1, p.321]
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 Scimitar Hill
21 August 1915
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Scimitar Hill now became the focus of a chaotic battle that raged to and fro as both sides gained temporary local superiority. As the day wore on the Turkish shelling increased and the tinder dry scrub on top of Scimitar Hill caught fire under the bursting shells. Gradually the British troops were forced back and the hill was lost at around noon. Attacks along Kiretch Tepe failed and attempts made to link the Suvla area to the newly expanded Anzac area were hotly contested. By nightfall on 9th August almost nothing had been achieved and most of the IX Corps was in serious disarray. Since 6th August the 10th and 11th Divisions had suffered severe casualties and had become hopelessly inter-mingled. The newly landed 53rd Division had been thrown into battle, piecemeal all along the British line. The chaos and confusion of orders and counter orders, lack of maps or briefing and the linked curses of heat, thirst and exhaustion had visibly reduced morale throughout all three divisions. The 9th August marked the end of any real chance of success at Suvla. Further attacks were futile as the pattern of events was fully established.
On 10 August an assault by 53rd Division on Scimitar Hill was a terrible failure and was eventually abandoned having achieved nothing but a hefty casualty list and another division had been ruined during its first two days of action. As they were attacking the 54th Division was landed at Suvla. It represented the last immediately available reserve and GHQ had intended to deploy it as a complete division for a decisive blow in an effort to capture Tekke Tepe. To prepare the way for this attack it was decided that the 163rd Brigade (including the 5th Battalion, Norfolk Regiment) should push forward on 12 August to the foothills of Tekke Tepe, clearing away pockets of snipers, to establish a secure line from which the main assault could be launched next day. The attempt was another dismal failure and the main attack was perforce cancelled. An attempt on 15 August by 10th Division to attack along Kiretch Tepe made some progress but any gains were lost to strong Turkish counter-attacks next day.
Stopford and many of the more inadequate divisional and brigade commanders were replaced and on 15th August General Beauvoir de Lisle arrived to take over temporary command of IX Corps. His priority was to organise a strike, as quickly and strongly as possible against the W Hills and Anafarta Spur. These features were still of crucial importance, not by then to support the failed Sari Bair operations, but to help protect the poor British positions scattered across the Suvla Plain from Turkish shell fire. The seriousness of the position was now apparent. At Suvla a frontage of 20,000 yards was being held by only 50,000 troops when really 80,000 were required at the accepted defence ratio of four men per yard. To make matters worse they were facing up to 75,000 Turks who still had reinforcements arriving on a daily basis. Hamilton and de Lisle decided on one last effort. After receiving reinforcements of the veteran 29th Division at Helles and the dismounted yeomanry of the 2nd Mounted Division on 18th August, a final attack was ordered on 21 August. This last gambler's throw of the dice was a dreadful failure and marked the end of the offensive.
Despite all the intensive effort and thousands of casualties the great August offensive had achieved nothing of real importance. The real objective - the capture of Sari Bair - had been denied Hamilton and the IX Corps had succeeded only in establishing itself a base. This was all that General Stopford ever thought possible but, by his pusillanimity, he had ensured that the brief golden opportunities at Suvla were wasted.
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Evacuation of Gallipoli
18 December 1915
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In London Hamilton's demands for more men in the aftermath of the failure of the August offensive had brought into question the utility of persisting at Gallipoli, especially in light of needs both on the Western Front and at Salonika. General Sir Charles Monro, who replaced Hamilton on 15 October, soon proposed evacuation. Kitchener visited Gallipoli in November, and endorsed Monro's recommendation. After a storm ravaged the peninsula in late November and caused many deaths among the exposed troops on both sides, the authorities in London reluctantly agreed to evacuate Suvla and Anzac.
In a well-planned operation which contrasted sharply with those mounted earlier in the campaign, the withdrawal was carried out successfully on 19 and 20 December. It was soon decided to evacuate Helles as well. This was completed on the night of 8/9 January, again almost without casualties.
One soldier wrote -
18/12/1915: The whole place seems deserted. We couldn't wish for better weather for the grand finale. The remaining Donkeys keep up a pathetic “HE- HAWING” as if they realised they will soon be abandoned. The airplanes are aloft all day long to keep off enemy observers. The garrison has been reduced - . To-morrow the remainder will embark, or what is left of them. The evacuation has hitherto been a tremendous success, but - To-morrow night will be very critical.
19/12/1915: We left Anzac last evening, marching in the sap leading to the pier. Not a word was spoken: not a match was struck. We proceeded rapidly and silently in the darkness. All were keyed up. We feared to hear the rifle fire at any moment. A few shells burst near the pier. We embarked with wonderful dispatch. The wharf was covered with sacks to deaden our foot falls. Only one was wounded by a stray bullet. We reached Mudros early in the morning, and arrived in camp in the evening. We slept deep and long for all were terribly weary from the strain . The first of the Anzac “Die -hards” arrived this afternoon. The last came at 5 o'clock this evening. They marched along the road between lines of cheering troops. Very proud they looked as the men cheered. None will forget those strained, exhausted, dauntless faces. Their only casualties were three
sprained ankles.
Conclusion: A Costly Failure
The Gallipoli campaign was a costly failure. While it is possible to point to moments when tactical developments offered the promise of success, the outcome was determined by strategic factors. Essentially there were not enough men available at the crucial moments.
Hamilton launched the campaign with five divisions against a roughly comparable Turkish force which enjoyed the advantage of operating on interior lines. The rough parity was sustained as the campaign progressed with the thirteen Allied divisions eventually facing fourteen Turkish divisions. The half-hearted approach in London, until July 1915, ensured that the Allied build-up was always too little too late. Inadequate leadership played a part in the Allied failure, and many men were sacrificed in futile attacks on strong positions, especially at Helles.
Of the 7500 New Zealand casualties, there were 2721 dead-one in four of those who landed. Australia's 26,000 casualties included 8000 fatalities
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On 19th December, as he waited to go, C.Q.M Sergeant A.L.Guppy, 14th Battalion, of Benalla, Victoria, confided his feelings in verse to his diary. His words probably spoke for all of them:
Not only muffled is our tread
To cheat the foe,
We fear to rouse our honoured dead
To hear us go.
Sleep sound, old friends - the keenest smart
Which, more than failure, wounds the heart,
Is thus to leave you - thus to part.
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Sources -
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